Sims v. MVM, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
704 F.3d 1327 · 2013
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 621 (§ 2 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 623 (§ 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 38 U.S.C. § 4311 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 703 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. · St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks · Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 78 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'but-for' cause requires a closer link than mere proximate causation; it requires that the proscribed animus have a determinative influence on the employer's adverse”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he text of the USERRA and the ADEA differ in important respects. The USERRA (and Title VII) requires that a plaintiff demonstrate discrimination by showing that the proscribed bias was a "motivating factor” in the adverse decision. 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (c) (USERRA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Title VII). As the Court in Staub emphasized, this "motivating factor" causation standard is simply the traditional tort law standard of proximate cause, requiring only "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged, and excludes only those link[s] that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” 131 S.Ct. at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, the ADEA states that it is unlawful if an employee suffers adverse employment action "because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, "to establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, ... a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 , 129 S.Ct. at 2350 . As noted above, a "but-for” cause requires a closer link than mere proximate causation; it requires that the proscribed animus have a determinative influence on the employer’s adverse decision. Id. As the Supreme Court cautions, "we 'must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’ ” Id. at 174 , 129 S.Ct. at 23”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“motivating factor” in the adverse decision. 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (c) (USERRA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Title VII). As the Court in Staub emphasized, this”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.