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← 704 F.3d 754 - United States v. Phillips

United States v. Phillips’s Empirical Analysis

704 F.3d 754 · 2012

Citation profile

43
cited by 43 later decisions
1
states following
January 2023
most recently cited

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002) · 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (§ 1352 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (§ 1352 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 3554 · 18 U.S.C. § 981 (§ 1366 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986) · 21 U.S.C. § 853 (§ 413 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · United States v. Booker · Apprendi v. New Jersey · Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. · United States v. Maze

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Although criminal forfeiture undoubtedly constitutes an element of punishment, see Libretti, 516 U.S. at 39 , 116 S.Ct. 356 , there is no statutory (or guideline) maximum limit on forfeitures. Rather, criminal forfeitures are indeterminate and open-ended, and may include all property “constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly,” from his unlawful conduct. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (a). The Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have all explicitly distinguished Booker and denied the right to a jury determination in the forfeiture context because forfeiture is not a “determinate sentencing scheme” with a “statutory maximum.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[A] reasonable person would understand that the prohibition on “frequenting] places” where illegal drugs are used or sold prohibits [the defendant] from knowingly going to a specific place where drugs are illegally used or sold, but that it does not prohibit him from living in Seattle or going to a given neighborhood simply because a person is selling drugs somewhere within that neighborhood.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “a place, such as Suzie's, that offers material depicting and/or describing sexually explicit conduct. B. The District Court Did Not Err by Concluding that Special Condition Nine Not Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague or Over-Broad. Ochoa argues that special condition nine is unconstitutionally vague. A condition of supervised release violates due process if it uses terms so vague that it”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.