Meininger v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The state's evidence tended to show that on the evening of April 8, 1995, [Meininger] was stopped by Alabama State Trooper David Dodgen for driving with an inoperable headlight. Trooper Dodgen testified that when he approached [Meininger's] vehicle to ask to see [Meininger's] driver's license, he smelled alcohol and saw an unopened container of beer on the front seat. He testified that after [Meininger] sat in his police vehicle for several minutes, he had [Meininger] perform some field sobriety tests. Trooper Dodgen testified that [Meininger] was unable to satisfactorily perform the tests. "Dodgen testified that he then placed [Meininger] under arrest for DUI and transported him to the county jail.... Dodgen testified that [at the jail] he waited 20 minutes and then performed two breathalizer tests on [Meininger]. He testified that the results of the first test showed a 0.155% blood alcohol level and [that] the result of the second test showed a 0.165% blood alcohol level. ".... "... [Meininger] first contends that the trial court erred by receiving into evidence Trooper Dodgen's testimony regarding [Meininger's] physical condition at the time he was stopped, the results of field sobriety tests, and his opinion of [Meininger's] sobriety. [Meininger] contends that because he was indicted under § 32-5A-191(a)(1), this testimony should not have been received into evidence.... "... In [ Curren v. State, 620 So.2d 739 (Ala.1993)], the Alabama Supreme Court... noted that § 32-5A-”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 704 So. 2d 1034 - Meininger v. State

2. “"Because the section [Meininger] was prosecuted under, § 32-5A-191 (a)(1), is an 'illegal per se' law, the state is required to prove only that a defendant's blood alcohol level is 0.10% or higher. Testimony by the state trooper regarding [Meininger's] physical condition, his performance in field sobriety tests, and the trooper's opinion of [Meininger's] sobriety all go toward showing that [Meininger] was intoxicated and guilty of driving under the influence, a violation of § 32-5A-191 (a)(2). 'Evidence of any offense other than that specifically charged is prima facie inadmissible.' Nicks v. State , 521 So.2d 1018 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 , 108 S.Ct. 2916 , 101 L.Ed.2d 948 (1988). "The Alabama Supreme Court ruled in Curren that because intoxication is not an element of § 32-5A-191 (a)(1), a defendant may not introduce evidence to rebut the presumption of intoxication if the defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.10% or greater. In accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Curren , we now hold that in prosecutions brought under § 32-5A-191 (a)(1), the state may not introduce evidence of the nature of that introduced in the present case concerning the defendant's intoxication. The trial court erred by receiving into evidence Trooper Dodgen's *Page 1036 testimony concerning [Meininger's] intoxication."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 704 So. 2d 1034 - Meininger v. State

3. “"Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given his consent, subject to the provisions of this division, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if lawfully arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The law enforcement agency by which such officer is employed shall designate which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered. Such person shall be told that his failure to submit to such a chemical test will result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 90 days; provided if such person objects to a blood test, the law enforcement agency shall designate that one of the other aforesaid tests be administered."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 704 So. 2d 1034 - Meininger v. State