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← 706 FSUPP2D 408 - Barberan v. Nationpoint

Barberan v. Nationpoint’s Empirical Analysis

2010

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
September 2018
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 2 district ·

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (§ 102 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (§ 103 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (§ 125 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (§ 130 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (§ 131 of the Truth in Lending Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1681 · 15 U.S.C. § 1681A · 15 U.S.C. § 1681G

Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Ashcroft v. Iqbal · Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. · Hughes v. Rowe · Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Under the total preemption approach, 'all state causes of action against furnishers of information are deemed preempted by the sweeping language of § 1681t(b)(l)(F).’ 'Under the temporal approach, state law claims based on actions of furnishers of information after the furnisher has received notice of inaccuracies are held preempted by § 1681t(b)(l)(F),’ but actions taken before notice has been received are not preempted by § 168lt(b)(l)(F) and are governed solely by § 1681h(e). Thus, under the temporal approach, a plaintiff may bring a common law state claim if it relates to actions taken by a furnisher of information before it received notice and if the furnisher took action with malice or willful intent to injure. Finally, under the statutory approach, courts have held that only state statutes are preempted by § 1681t(b)(l)(F), 'while section 1681h(e)- and its malice requirement-applies to state common law torts.’”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Where the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action to foreclose a mortgage, or to enforce a vendor’s lien, has expired, any person having an estate or interest in the real property subject to such encumbrance may maintain ah action against any other person or persons, known or unknown ... to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance, and to adjudge the estate or interest of the plaintiff in such real property to be free therefrom. ... In any action brought under this section it shall be immaterial whether the debt upon which the mortgage or lien was based has, or has not, been paid; and also whether the mortgage in question was, or was not, given to secure a part of the purchase price.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]he § 1681h(e) authorization Ross seeks involves a two-step inquiry. First, we ask whether the claim falls within the scope of § 1681h(e), which includes only claims “based on information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or part on the report.” The second step in the analysis involves determining whether the “malice or willful intent to injure” exception to the general bar against state law actions applies.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.