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706 N.W.2d 491

State v. Lee

Supreme Court of Minnesota

Decided December 8, 2005

Supreme Court of Minnesota · decided 2005-12-08

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably State v. Martin (2009), State v. Vang (2014)

27 state decisions

Relies on State v. Foss

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2005-12-08

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PAGE, Justice

¶1(concurring).

¶2In Foss, we noted that:

In Krotzer, the defendant admitted to having consensual sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Neither the girlfriend nor the girlfriend’s mother wanted the prosecutor to file criminal charges against the defendant. Nonetheless, the prosecutor insisted on prosecuting the defendant for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. As we stated in our opinion, the trial court strongly disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision and believed that it was totally inappropriate that the defendant be given a criminal record as a predatory sex offender, with the concomitant requirement that he register as a predatory sex offender.

¶3State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540-41 (Minn.1996). On the basis of those facts, we also noted that “the circumstances in [.Krotzer ] constituted special circumstances warranting the unusual judicial action of staying adjudication of guilt over the prosecutor’s objection and in the absence of statutory authority.”1Id.We went on to state:

It was not our intention that mere disagreement by the trial court with the prosecutor’s exercise of the charging discretion would constitute “special circumstances.” Rather, it was our inten*497tion that the inherent judicial authority recognized in that case be relied upon sparingly and only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.

¶4Id. at 541.

¶5In light of the prosecutor’s extremely broad discretion, by defining what constitutes “special circumstances” so narrowly in Foss, we effectively overruled Krotzer. Having done so sub rosa there, we should now remove the rose and do so explicitly here.

¶6. Other than noting that the trial court in Krotzer "disagreed with the prosecutor’s decision" and that Krotzer would have received a criminal sentence requiring that he register as a predatory sex offender, we did not explain what constituted the prosecutor's "clear abuse of discretion” in the exercise of the charging function. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 540-41. Thus, it appears that what ultimately constituted the special circumstances in Krot-zer was the harsh result that would have occurred absent the stay of adjudication. Certainly, there was nothing about the offense itself that gave rise to the "special circumstances.” Analytically, it is hard to see how the facts of this case, absent Foss, would yield a different result than Krotzer. As the trial court noted, the result that is likely to flow from Lee being convicted is not likely to "serve the public interest.”

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