¶1specially concurring:
¶2I am of the opinion that the testimony in this case created a fact situation for the jury to resolve upon proper instruction, to-wit: Whether Broaddrick was acting in self defense when he shot Craft.
¶3Paula Oates testified that when Ray Craft made his sudden move, she thought he “was either going to reach for a gun or try to take the gun away from Tommy that Tommy had or do something stupid.” (Emphasis added). She told another individual that when Graft made his sudden move, the appellant cried, “No, Ray, don’t.” This witness also was told by Mrs. Oates that she thought Craft was going for a gun. Immediately after the shooting, appellant, according to Ms. Oates, pounded the dashboard of his car, saying, “Why did he make me do that.” Based on this evidence and other testimony in the record, I agree with Judge Brett that the trial court erred in refusing the appellant’s requested instruction on this issue.
¶4It appears that the dissent would urge the trial judge to make certain factual find*538ings before an instruction could be given. This would be clearly contrary to 22 O.S. 1981, § 834, which states, in pertinent part, that “questions of law are to be decided by the court, and the questions of fact are to be decided by the jury....” Our current approach — the practice in this State since time immemorial — has been to require the trial court to give a theory of defense instruction, if requested, when there is any evidence in the record to support the defense, and even if the evidence is discredited. See White v. State, 458 P.2d 322, 327 (Okl.Cr.1969). See also Finley v. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 309, 181 P.2d 849 (1947) (theory of defense instruction should be given where that position finds “possible support in the evidence”). Any heavier standard would usurp the sacred obligation of the jury to be the exclusive trier of fact.