Conroy v. Vilsack’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 10 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Under our precedent, the requisite causal connection may be shown by “evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action.” O’Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Burns v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, however, “very- close temporal proximity between the protected activity: and the retaliatory conduct” is lacking, “the plaintiff must offer additional evidence to establish causation.” Id. ... It appears clear that, if the adverse action, occurs in a brief period up to one and a half months after the protected activity, temporal proximity alone will be sufficient to establish the requisite causal inference; but it is equally patent that if the adverse action occurs three months out and beyond, from the protected activity, then the action’s timing alone will not be sufficient to establish the causation element. See Anderson v. Coots Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999) (“[W]e have held that a one and one-half month period between protected activity and adverse action may, by itself, establish causation. By contrast, we have held that' a three-month period, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation.” (citations omitted)). However, where along the temporal line beyond one and one-half months but short of three months, the adverse action’s timing ceases to be suf-.tficient, standing alone, to establish”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 173 F. Supp. 3d 1139 - Jackson-Cobb v. Sprint United Management

2. “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 544 F. App'x 817 - Jeffrey v. CP Kelco U.S., Inc.

3. “demonstratle] that the employer's explanation for its decision was so implausible, incoherent, or internally contradictory that the decision must have been made on some other basis.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kunej v. Labor Commission