Peterson v. Martinez’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 9 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he Heller opinion notes that, “[ljike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-cen-tury cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554 U.S. at 626 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 . As an example of the limited nature of the Second Amend ment right to keep and carry arms, the Court observed that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.” Id. And the Court stressed that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions.” Id. There can be little doubt that bans on the concealed carrying of firearms are longstanding. In Heller , the Supreme Court cited several early eases in support of the statement that most nineteenth century courts approved of such prohibitions.... ... Given this lengthy history of regulation, restrictions on concealed carry qualify as “longstanding” and thus “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 & n. 26, 128 S.Ct. 2783 ; see also National Rifle Association of America, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Heller demonstrates that a regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ even if it cannot boast a precise founding-era analogue ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Clark v. City of Shawnee

2. “[t]his is a reasonable presumption because a regulation that is "longstanding," which necessarily means it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly the activities covered by a longstanding regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by the Second Amendment. A plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing the regulation does have more than a de minimis effect upon his right. ... We uphold the requirement of mere registration because it is longstanding, hence "presumptively lawful," and the presumption stands unrebutted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Pena v. Lindley

3. “went to great lengths to emphasize the special place that the home— an individual’s private property — occupies in our society.”). 3 . See Act of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts at 172; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1820 Ind. Acts at 39; Act of Oct. 19, 1821, ch. XIII, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 15 (”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Peruta v. County of San Diego