Orndorff v. Lockhart’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a]ll of the instances where Ms. Lehman's trial testimony differed from or added to her previous statements need not be discussed because the court finds that the prosecutor's failure to disclose [the hypnosis] was inherently prejudicial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Orndorff v. Al Lockhart Holmes · Orndorff v. Al Lockhart Holmes

2. “The trial court limited the petitioners to a total of twelve peremptory challenges pursuant to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-1929 (Repl. 1977) (now codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 15-33-307 (1987)), which provides that when several defendants are tried jointly a challenge by one shall be the challenge by all. The petitioners argue that, had they been tried separately, each would have been entitled to twelve peremptory challenges, and that because they were limited to a total of twelve in the joint proceeding they have been denied equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument is without merit. First, there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenge. [Stilson] v. United States, 250 U.S. [583], 40 S.Ct. 28 , 63 L.Ed. 1154 (1919). All that is guaranteed by the constitution is the right to an impartial jury. Id.; U.S. const, amend. VI. This the petitioners received. Second since ... there is not at issue a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution, this court must analyze the petitioners’ claim under the rational basis standard of review. Harris v. [McRae], 448 U.S. 297, 322 , 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2691 , 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 at 425 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 at 1104 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)). Under that standard the petitioners’ claim fails because the state’s legitimate interest in expediting trials, thereby conserving judicial resources, is rationally related to the procedural rule enacted. For the same reason the petitioner”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 868 F. Supp. 1471 - Ruiz v. Norris

3. “The petitioners take the position that the trial court’s denial of their motions for separate trials was an abuse of discretion which resulted in a “smear effect” among them ... In as much as this argument turns on alleged violations of Arkansas procedural rules it does not state a claim for habeas relief. Rather, the petitioners must show that the trial court’s failure to grant their motions for severance rendered the joint proceeding fundamentally unfair so as to violate due process. Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726 (11th Cir.1987); Manning v. Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 786 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.1986); Cf. Robinson v. Wyrick, 735 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 , 105 S.Ct. 390 , 83 L.Ed.2d 324 (1984) (to obtain federal habeas relief for failure to sever offenses, the joinder must render the trial fundamentally unfair). Upon review of the record the court finds that the petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof. At voir dire each of the jurors stated under oath that he or she could consider each defendant separately and they were instructed at the close of trial that they must so consider each defendant, rendering separate verdicts as if each had been tried separately.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 868 F. Supp. 1471 - Ruiz v. Norris