Ozaltin v. Ozaltin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “acclimatization” — later replicated by our Court in Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 , 134 (2d Cir.2005) — as a short-hand reference for "the sense of being well-adjusted in one's present environment.” Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 , 1079 (9th Cir.2001). We prefer the less cumbersome term "acclimation” to denote the same concept. 3 .Article 3 provides, in full: The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where — ■ a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State. Hague Convention, art. 3. 4 . We have repeatedly observed that the Pér-ez-Vera Report is "an authoritative source for interpreting the Convention’s provisions.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Guzzo v. Cristofano · Buenaver v. Vasquez

2. “[Section] 11607(b)(3) retains what we have previously described as the “equitable” nature of cost awards: Moore v. County of Delaware, 586 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir.2009).... [A] prevailing petitioner in a return action is presumptively entitled to necessary costs, subject to the application of equitable principles by the district court. Absent any statutory guidance to the contrary, the appropriateness of such costs depends on the same general standards that apply when “attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s discretion.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 , 114 S.Ct. 1023 , 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994). “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable discretion should be exercised in light of the [relevant] considerations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rath v. Marcoski · 987 F. Supp. 2d 910 - Mendoza v. Silva

3. “the person who removed or retained the child ... to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the applicant, including travel expenses, any costs incurred or payments made for locating the child, the costs of legal representation of the applicant, and those of returning the child.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Rath v. Marcoski · 987 F. Supp. 2d 910 - Mendoza v. Silva