Gilbert v. Visone’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “of the parties in these limited circumstances: (1) the nonparty is the successor in interest of a party; (2) the nonparty controlled the prior litigation; or (3) the nonparty's interests were adequately represented by a party to the action who may be considered the”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen · 248 So. 3d 633 - Davisson v. Davisson

2. “Under former [LSA-C.C.] Art. 2286, a judgment had preclusive effect on those who were parties to the action Uin which the judgment was rendered, on the successors in interest of those parties, and on others who “shared the same quality as parties,” such as one whose alleged liability derived solely from legal or contractual responsibility for the actions of another. [[Image here]] Under federal law, the preclusive effect of a judgment binds the parties to the action and non-parties who are deemed the “privies” of the parties in these limited circumstances: [1] the nonparty is the successor in interest of a party; [2] the nonparty controlled the prior litigation; or [3] the nonparty’s interests were adequately represented by a party to the action who may be considered the “virtual representative” of the nonparty because the interests of the party and the nonparty are so closely aligned. The broader federal law, like the present state law, (La. R.S. 13:4231 et seq., amending former Art. 2286), precludes not only those claims that were actually litigated in the earlier proceeding, but any other claims between the same parties arising out of the same “transaction” or the same “nucleus of operative facts.” [[Image here]] Visone has not asserted or shown in this record that he was a successor in interest of [the manufacturer] in [the manufacturer’s] dealings with [the distributor], or that he controlled [the manufacturer’s] defense of the federal action .... Under these circumstanc”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hines v. Smith

3. “Cardio, a Louisiana corporation, in 1979 entered into a two-year exclusive sales agreement with Telectronics, a pacemaker manufacturer domiciled in Colorado, to sell Telectronics products in six southern states, including Louisiana, Arkansas and Mississippi. In that same year, Cardio then separately contracted with John Visone, a Shreveport resident, to serve as Cardio's sales representative in north Louisiana and south Arkansas for roughly the same two-year period, 1979-1981, irrespective of which manufacturer or manufacturers supplied the products to be sold by Cardio during the contract period. Notwithstanding this express provision, Visone unilaterally terminated his contractual relationship with Cardio after Telectronics terminated its contract with Cardio [for cause as the federal court later found] and accepted Telectronics' offer to serve as an exclusive sales representative of Telectronics in the same territory, as evidenced by a third contract in the record. Visone was not a party to the federal court action, nor to the 1979 exclusive sales agreement between Telectronics and Cardio. The federal court's jurisdiction to adjudicate Cardio's breach of contract claim against Telectronics, the only claim asserted in the complaint, was premised solely on the diversity of citizenship between the two litigants. The only portions of the federal court record that appear in this record are the complaint, the district court's judgment and reasons for judgment, the per curiam aff”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 743 So. 2d 909 - Gilbert v. Visone