708 So. 2d 918 - Frey v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"To determine whether resisting arrest with violence is a general intent or specific intent crime, we look to the plain language of the statute: 843.01 Resisting officer with violence to his person.—Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree.... § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (1993). "The statute's plain language reveals that no heightened or particularized, i.e., no specific, intent is required for the commission of this crime, only a general intent to `knowingly and willfully' impede an officer in the performance of his or her duties. In fact, the statute is similar in format to the statute defining arson, which we held to be a general intent crime. Only if the present statute were to be recast to require a heightened or particularized intent would the crime of resisting arrest with violence be a specific intent crime. Our holding is in harmony with our precedent.[FN3]”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. C.B. v. State · Polite v. State

2. “The term `knowingly' by itself does not create a specific intent crime. United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1988).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Polite v. State · 919 So. 2d 592 - Carrada v. State