Diamond v. Lamotte’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) false representation of a material fact (2) made with scienter (3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied (4) that proximately caused the plaintiff's damages.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 682 F. Supp. 1563 - Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, Inc. · 591 F. Supp. 362 - John Alden Life Insurance v. C.A. Cavendes, Sociedad Financiera

2. “Regarding the relief available to these plaintiffs against these defendants, we note that in McNeal it was determinative of the issue that the plaintiffs could not state a cause of action for “churning” against a broker under the Georgia Securities Act of 1957. In contrast, [in White ] where the state blue sky statute provided all the legally cognizable relief which the plaintiff requested, the fact that Rule 10b-5 provided redress to a broader range of potential plaintiffs was not deemed to be “of controlling significance.” In this case, appellants, as purchasers, sought relief against the appellees either as principals or aiders and abetters. Clearly such a claim is cognizable under both the fraud and blue sky statutes. Additionally the appellants sought relief from various defendants on the theory of “controlling persons” liability____ Such a claim is cognizable under the blue sky statute but is generally not allowed in common law fraud actions____ Finally, the appellants sought return of their consideration paid for the TBA notes, interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to their Rule 10b-5 claim. Each of these measures of recovery is available under the fraud and blue sky actions____ Because no meaningful substantive distinction arises between the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action asserted here and comparable actions available under the common law fraud and blue sky statute, we are left with a comparison of the relative purposes served by various statutes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 595 F. Supp. 1442 - Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore

3. “In concluding that the cause of action available under Georgia’s general fraud statute, rather than that available under the Georgia Securities Act of 1957, most closely resembles the 10b-5 cause of action relied upon here, we find determinative the fact that McNeal seeks damages against a broker, on account of alleged churning of his account, and does not seek rescission from an actual purchaser or seller of securities. Although the language of section 11 of the Georgia Securities Act of 1957 mimics that of Rule 10b-5 in prohibiting employment of “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,” the remedy made available by section 13 is expressly limited to an action for rescission by a purchaser against a seller. As such, the remedy is ineffective to a 10(b) plaintiff such as McNeal, who was allegedly injured by Paine, Webber’s actions as an agent rather than as a principal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 595 F. Supp. 1442 - Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore