¶1DISSENTING OPINION OF
¶2I dissent.
¶3The majority states:
In searching a multiple-occupancy dwelling in which all occupants have access to all parts of such residence, a single warrant authorizing the search of the entire premises is valid and reasonable.
¶4See syllabus, supra.
¶5I concur with that statement of law. But in this case there was no evidence that all the occupants of the house had access to Woolsey’s bedroom where the evidence sought to be suppressed was found.
¶6The affidavit in support of the search warrant implicated Lori Schmitt; Woolsey was not implicated in any way. Prior to commencing a search of Woolsey’s room, the police had ascertained that the bedroom was Woolsey’s. The police had no knowledge or reason to believe that Schmitt or anyone else had access to Woolsey’s room.
¶7Unless the police had a reasonable belief that the occupants had access to Woolsey’s room, or could establish some link to the criminality under investigation, the police were obligated to limit *643the search to common areas and areas accessible to Schmitt. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b), at 219 (2d ed. 1987). Cf. State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 692 P.2d 1156 (1985).
¶8Nothing in the record supports the search of Woolscy’s bedroom. I would reverse the circuit court’s order denying suppression of evidence found in Woolsey’s bedroom, and remand for a new trial.