Babcock’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Once we are satisfied, which we are, that the Federal sentences imposed in 1987 are to be considered interdependent and aggregated, we are in turn persuaded that the State judge imposing sentences in 1988 intended that those sentences be served “from and after” the total of the aggregated Federal sentences. At no time did the judge state, nor was it stated in any mittimus, that he intended that any portion of the State sentences by served concurrently with any portion of the Federal sentences. The word “concurrent” appears in the State sentencing dispositions only in connection with the other State sentences. Had it in fact been the State judge’s intention to confer on the petitioner the benefit that he posits, i.e. that his incarceration pursuant to the State sentences not exceed the time he would serve under the Federal sentences, the judge would surely have so indicated by identifying expressly in what way the Federal and State sentences would operate concurrently. That he referred only to the Federal “sentence” in the singular suggests to us only that he perceived the thirty-year sentence and the five-year enhancement to be a single sentence for his purposes. See Carlino v. Commissioner of Correction, 355 Mass. 159, 161 , 243 N.E.2d 799 (1969) (sentencing judge’s use of singular form of “sentence,” reasonably construed, referred to plural form where sentences were for all practical purposes one sentence). *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 767 F. Supp. 2d 234 - Babcock v. Pepe

2. “In doing so, [the judge] stated in dictum that the Federal sentences imposed on the petitioner in 1987 appeared to be interdependent, and therefore should be aggregated for the purpose of determining commencement of the State sentences. In the final analysis, however, he based his ruling exclusively on the proposition that, whether the Federal sentences were viewed in the aggregate, or only service of the thirty-year sentence was considered, the State sentences would have commenced at the earliest in February, 2003. If so, the petitioner’s presumptive release date would take place in January, 2009, he was not presently eligible for immediate release, and a writ of habeas corpus could not issue.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 767 F. Supp. 2d 234 - Babcock v. Pepe

3. “[w]hile the United States Supreme Court has determined that the statute creates a separate offense distinct from the underlying felony, thereby ultimately requiring a fact finder to decide whether the elements necessary to warrant conviction have been satisfied, see Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 2090 , 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000), the decision was not intended to alter the purpose of the statute, i.e., to provide a penalty additional to the sentence imposed for the underling offense. Thus, the long-standing view of the Federal courts that sentences imposed under § 924(c) and an underlying felony should be seen as “interdependent” or a “package” remain intact.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 767 F. Supp. 2d 234 - Babcock v. Pepe