Coca v. Arceo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 78 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 84 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Naturally, an innkeeper is not and cannot be an insurer of a guest or patron against personal injuries inflicted by another person on the premises, other than his servants or agents. Nevertheless, the proprietor of a place of business who holds it out to the public for entry for his business purposes, is subject to liability to guests who are upon the premises and who are injured by the harmful acts of third persons if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor could have discovered that such acts were being done or about to be done, and could have protected against the injury by controlling the conduct of the other patron.”

   12 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · Romero v. Kendricks

2. “. . . a sequence of conduct sufficiently long to enable the proprietor to act for the patron's safety.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kimple v. Foster · Eastep v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc.

3. ““ * * * [Wjhere an appeal is taken from a summary judgment, this court will review the testimony in the most favorable aspect it will bear in support of plaintiff’s claim of the right to present the merits of his case to the fact-finder.. (Citations omitted.) Litigants are entitled to the right of trial where there-is the slightest doubt as to the facts. * *" “Particularly with respect to the use-of summary judgment in a negligence-action, 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 2232,. § 56.17(42), states as follows: “ ‘ [It is] the general proposition that issues of negligence, including such related issues as contributory negligence,, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.’ “It would seem that, especially in negligence cases, the weight of authority is to deny summary judgment, for the obvious reason that there are ordinarily material fact issues to be determined. In the few cases cited by Professor Moore in which summary judgment was-granted in negligence cases, it has been done only when it appeared that the party seeking the summary judgment could in no sense have been determined responsible, or where the plaintiff actually admitted no negligence, or failed to deny that the accident happened in such a manner as to show lack of negligence.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. DeArman v. Popps · Cortez v. Martinez