71 So. 3d 881 - Marrero v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2011
Citation profile
28 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on William Fiore v. Gregory White Warden · 389 So. 2d 968 - Butterworth in and for Broward Cty. v. Fluellen · 573 So. 2d 330 - State v. Hawthorne · 306 So. 2d 104 - Negron v. State · 875 So. 2d 408 - State v. Burris
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]t would be problematic to leave the significant determination of whether a Florida citizen is deemed a convicted felon to thé arbitrary and unpredictable “life' experience” of a jury. The “life experience” of individual jury members varies widely within individual communities, and even more so throughout this very diverse State. A contractor living in Miami-Dade County may have a very different understanding of the costs associated with hurricane resistant doors than a retired grandmother living in Pensacola. Branding a Florida citizen with the label “convicted felon” must be approached with care and extreme caution, 'based only on evidence and facts from which conclusions can be drawn, not these widely varying “life experiences.” ‘ The application of a “life experience” exception to any criminal statute, including the criminal theft statute, is' inconsistent with the uniform system of justice that both the Florida and Federal Constitutions require and should not be left to the whim of individual jury members'.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“A plain reading of this criminal theft provision reveals that a jury is only allowed to determine a minimum value instead of an actual value if the value of property cannot be ascertained. Jackson replaces the requirement that the value of the stolen property be impossible to ascertain with a completely unrelated condition of the State’s failure to present evidence of value (although capable of valuation) and jurors “could not doubt that its value exceeded” the required amount. See Jackson, 413 So.2d at 112 . This misinterpretation of the criminal theft statute is not supported by any authority whatsoever and in fact runs contrary to the plain language of the criminal theft statute and the criminal mischief statute. We therefore disapprove of Jackson’s disregard of the impossibility prerequisite articulated in section 812.012(10)(b).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Our purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Instead, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an umreasonable l-esult or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.