Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

71 Tex. Crim. 162

158 S.W 1008

Dennis v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1913-06-18

<p>1.—Burglary—Night-time—Indictment.</p> <p>Where the indictment correctly charged burglary in the night-time according to approved precedent, the same was sufficient. Following Williams v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 69, and other cases.</p> <p>3.—Same—-Motion to Postpone—Copy of Indictment.</p> <p>Where it did not appear from the record that defendant had not been served two days before the trial with a true copy of the indictment, there was no error on this ground.</p> <p>3. —Same—Charge of Court—Daytime.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary at night, the court’s charge required the jury that they must find that defendant entered the alleged house at night before they could find him guilty, there was no error in refusing a requested charge that they could not convict him for daytime burglary.</p> <p>4. —Same—Name of Party Injured—Idem Sonans.</p> <p>Where the different names by which the owner was named in the indictment and was known were idem sonans, there was no variance, and there was no error in refusing a special charge thereon. Following Feeny v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Bep., 585, and other cases.</p> <p>5. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Charge of Court—Article 743, C. C. P.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary, the evidence, although circumstantial, showed without dispute the guilt of the defendant and no special charge was requested on circumstantial evidence, and no exception made to the court’s failure to charge thereon except in the motion for new trial, there was no reversible error, under article 743, Code Criminal Procedure. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>6. —Same—Charge of Court—Insanity.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary, defendant’s only defense was insanity and the court properly submitted this issue, and the evidence sustained the conviction, there was no error.</p> <p>7. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Article 743, C. C. P.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary, the evidence was entirely circumstantial, but established defendant’s guilt, the court’s failure to instruct on circumstantial evidence was harmless error under article 743, Code Criminal Procedure.</p> <p>8. —Same—Night-time Burglary—Want of Consent—Breaking.</p> <p>Where the indictment alleged a night-time burglary by force and breaking, it was unnecessary to either allege or prove in specific terms the want of the owner’s consent. Following Sullivan v. State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 462, and other eases.</p> <p>9. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Force—House.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary by night, the evidence sustained the conviction and showed that the alleged entry was made by opening a door, it was not necessary to show actual breaking. Articles 1306, 1308, Penal Code, and where the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and that the room entered was a house defined by statutes, there was no error.</p> <p>[¡Rehearing denied June 37, 1913.—Keporter.]</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1981

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1913-06-18

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge

¶1 (dissenting).—The majority opinion concedes this to be a case purely dependent upon circumstantial evidence and that a charge on that subject should have been given. But it is asserted that the error is not reversible because the evidence is so strong that the jury were bound to convict, therefore error is' protected by terms of article 743, Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not believe that because the evidence is strong the court is justified in not charging the law of the case. If this be true, then the court need not charge any phase of the law at all if the facts show strongly or even conclusively the guilt of the accused. This can not be correct under our statute, which requires the court to give in writing a charge on the law applicable to the facts whether requested or not. Art. 735, C. C. P. Appellant reserved his exception in motion' for new trial. This is sufficient b)r the wording of the statute. C. C. P., art. 743. It has been always held to be fundamental error not to charge on circumstantial evidence whether excepted to or not. White’s Annotated C. C. P., sec. 813, where a "great number of cases are cited; also Branch’s Grim. Law, secs. 202-203. If this universal rule has been changed, it is by reason of the fact that article (C. C. P.) 743 requires exception to be taken during the trial or on motion for new trial. Exception was duly reserved on motion for new trial by appellant. But my brethren conceding this to be the' law, say it is not error because they find the facts to be sufficient to sustain the verdict, and that the jury ought to have found the same verdict had the law been given. I do not know what the verdict' would have been under a charge giving the law. I do not care to write further. The affirmance 'is in the face of the law. The judgment ought to be reversed.

/71/texcrim/162 · .json · Public domain