McGee v. Mathis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 4 district · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is not doubted that the grant by the United States to the State upon conditions, and the acceptance of the grant by the State, constituted a contract. All the elements of a contract met in the transaction — competent parties, proper subject-matter, sufficient consideration, and consent of minds. This contract was binding upon the State * *”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York · United States v. Marion County School District

2. “It was strenuously urged for the defendant that the exemption contemplated by the statute was exemption from general taxation, and not from special taxation for local improvements benefiting the land, such as the making of levees, and many authorities were cited in support of this view. The argument would have great force if the provision for exemption had been contained in a general tax law, or in a law in framing which the legislature might reasonably be supposed to have in view general taxation only. But the provision under consideration is found in a law providing for the construction of levees and drains, and devoting to that object funds supposed to be more than adequate, derived from the very lands exempted, and the exemption is for ten years or until reclaimed, and is offered as an inducement to take up the lands and thus furnish those funds. It is impossible to say that this exemption was not from taxation-for the purpose of making these levees and drains as well; as from taxation in general. Any other construction would ascribe to the legislature an intention to take the whole land for the purposes of the improvement, and then to load it with taxation for. the same object in the hands of purchasers whom it had led to expect exemption from all taxation, at least until the land should be reclaimed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Illinois Central Railroad v. Decatur

3. “The contract of the State was to convey the land for the scrip, and to refrain from taxation for the time specified. Every piece of scrip was a contract between the State and the original holder and his assigns. Now what was the effect of that contract when made? Did it not bind the State to receive the scrip in payment for swamp land, exempted for a limited time from taxation? The scrip, if not receivable for lands, was worthless. To annul the quality of re-ceivability was to annul the contract. But the exemption of the lands for which it was receivable from taxation was a principal element in its value; and repeal of the exemption was the destruction of this element of value. This was clearly an impairment of the contract. The State could no more change the terms of the contract by changing the stipulated character of the land to be conveyed, in satisfaction of the scrip as to liability to taxation, than it could abrogate the contract altogether by refusing to receive- the scrip at all in payment for land. We are constrained to regard the repeal of the exemption act, so far as it concerns lands paid for, either before or after the repeal, by scrip issued and paid out before repeal, as impairing the contract of the State with the holders of the scrip.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 176 So. 3d 1049 - Midstates Petroleum, LLC v. State Mineral & Energy Board