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← 71 U.S. 657 - Robbins v. Chicago City

Robbins v. Chicago City’s Empirical Analysis

71 U.S. 657 · 1866

Citation profile

302
cited by 302 later decisions
11
cited 11 times by the Supreme Court
34
states following
August 2005
most recently cited

63 federal appellate · 30 district · 143 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 302 later decisions (11 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2005 · most notably Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. (1926), Mashington Gaslight Co v. District of Columbia (1896)

63 federal appellate · 30 district · 143 state decisions — followed in 34 states

700186618701880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Chicago City v. Robbins · Witmer v. Schlatter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 302 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Conclusivo effect of judgments respecting the same cause of action and between the same parties rests upon the just and expedient axiom that it is for the interest of. the community that a limit should be opposed to the continuance of litigation, and that the same cause of action should not be brought twice to a final determination. Parties in that connection include all who are directly interested in ihe subject-matter, and who had a right to make defense, control the proceedings, examino and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal from the judgment. Persons not having those rights substantially arc regarded as strangers to the cause, but all who are directly interested in the suit and have knowledge of its pendency, and who refuse or neglect 1o appear and avail themselves of those rights, are equally concluded by the proceedings.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Under the term ‘parties,’ in this connection, the law includes all who are directly interested in the subject-matter and had a right to make defense or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment. This right involves, also, the right to adduce testimony and to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on the other side. Persons not having these rights are regarded as strangers to the cause. But, to give full effect to the principle by which parties are held hound by a judgment, all persons Who are represented by the parties and claim under them, or in privity with them, are equally concluded by the same proceedings. We have already seen that the term ‘privity’ denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property. The ground, therefore, upon which persons standing in this relation to the litigating party are bound by the proceedings to which he was a party is that they are identified with him in interest; and whenever this identity is found to exist all are alike concluded. Hence all privies, whether in estate, in blood, or in law, are estopped from litigating that which Is conclusive on him with whom they arc in privity.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““The party contracting for the work is liable. * * * Where the work to be done necessarily constituted an obstruction or defect in the street or highway, which rendered it dangerous as a way for travel and transportation, unless properly guarded, or shut out from public use; that in such eases the principal for whom the work was done could not defeat the just claim * * * of the injured party, by proving that the1 work which constituted the obstruction or defect was done by an independent contractor. * * * Where the obstruction or defect which occasioned the injury results directly from the acts which the contractor agrees and is authorized to do, the person who employs the contractor and authorizes him to do those acts is equally liable to the injured party.” (Several cases are cited, which we omit.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.