Dickey v. Greene’s Empirical Analysis
710 F.2d 1003 · 1983
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently March 2013
9 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. · Roberts v. Florida · Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. · Rowell v. United States · Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved....”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) also requires that notice of the charge [filed with the EEOC] “be served upon the person against whom such charge is made.” In the event that the EEOC is unable to secure from the respondent an acceptable conciliation agreement, then “a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge... by the person claiming to be aggrieved ...” (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). These statutory provisions leave no uncertainty that in order to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of a Title VII suit, a charge must first be filed with the EEOC against the party sued... (citations omitted). This requirement is no mere technicality. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Bowe [Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.1969) ], it “serves two important purposes. First it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the Act’s primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law.” Id. at 719 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Region P. Human Development Agency, Inc.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Dickey v. Greene
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.