Furlong v. Long Island College Hospital’s Empirical Analysis
710 F.2d 922 · 1983
Citation profile
30 federal appellate · 9 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 72 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2019 · most notably Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (1991), Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Board of Realtors (1988)
30 federal appellate · 9 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act)
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Rideout v. United States · Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar · Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital · Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We agree with the First and Tenth Circuits that it would not be prudent to extract from, McLain a generalized rule that antitrust jurisdiction can be established simply by showing that some aspects of a defendant’s business have a relationship to interstate commerce. Rather the inquiry must be whether the defendant’s activity that has allegedly been “infected” by unlawful conduct can be shown “ ‘as a matter of practical economics’ to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved.” McLain, supra, 444 U.S. at 246 , 100 S.Ct. at 511 , quoting Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738 , 745, 96 S.Ct. 1848 , 1852, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). The requisite showing will vary with the type of unlawful conduct alleged. With a price-fixing allegation, as in McLain, the link between the “infected” activities and an ultimate effect on commerce was easily posited, since price-fixing is generally recognized as tending to restrict output, and the complaint adequately alleged interstate activities — real estate financing and title insurance — that would be adversely affected if the local brokerage activities of the defendants were diminished. In prior cases, the Court has spelled out in more detail the causal chain by which the alleged illegality could be expected to affect the relevant lines of commerce. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 , 88 S.Ct. 443 , 19 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 , 235-44, 6”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“her complaint mentions “price-fixing” in a caption to her antitrust cause of action, she has not alleged the classic agreement between competitors that concerned the Court in McLain . There is no claim that competing hospitals or associations of anesthesiologists have conspired to fix the prices for their services. In fact, there is no allegation of price-fixing in any of the operative language of the complaint. Though we do not doubt that á price-fixing conspiracy or a group boycotting scheme can be shown “as a matter of practical economics” to have an adverse effect on the perpetrator’s interstate activities, this complaint fails to set forth any facts from which it is inferable that the defendants’ activities, infected with the particular illegality alleged, are likely to have a substantial effect on commerce. That omission is not surprising, since it is not easy to imagine how the exclusion of Dr. Furlong from LIAA and the various harassments alleged to have prompted her withdrawal from the LICH medical staff might be shown to have a predictable tendency to restrict the defendants’ purchase of supplies from out of state. Though we do not agree with Judge Sifton that defendants’ activities are irrelevant as a matter of logic, we do. agree that the complaint in its present form fails to set forth facts from which the jurisdictional element, based on defendants’ activities, is inferable.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]his view [that we should only look to the plaintiff's activities] ignores the rationale behind the Sherman Act’s condemnation of such anticompetitive schemes as price-fixing and group boycotting. Such schemes are prohibited because they permit those who perpetrate them to constrict supply, raise prices, and lower output. If output decreases, a defendant’s demand for the goods and services it uses will also decrease. Thus, as a matter of substantive antitrust law, there is no defect in a complaint that alleges that a denial of staff privileges, undertaken in furtherance of a price-fixing or group boycotting scheme, may ultimately affect certain of the activities that connect a hospital to interstate commerce.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.