710 So. 2d 1074 - State v. Boyd’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “| ;>iThe complained of phrase has an easily understood meaning within the context of its use in the statute. We find that the clear and unambiguous wording of the statute means that any battery of a police officer which necessitates that the officer seek the care of doctors, nurses or other medical services, including but not limited to operations, hospitals, and institutional care incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness sustained in the battery is “require[d] medical attention.” We reject the trial court’s assessment that the phrase could “mean that the officer was examined and released without treatment” or where the officer has “a band aid [sic ] [applied] by the officer or another non-physician party.” These hypothetical situations, without any other facts, are obviously not injuries which require medical attention. The mere fact that a battered officer seeks medical attention is not sufficient to make the treatment medically necessary. We find that “an injury which requires medical attention” is an injury where the battered officer receives a battery for which the attention of a medical professional (nurse, paramedic, doctor, etc.) is required. For example, while a simple scratch normally would not require medical attention, a scratch, bite or needle prick where the officer is possibly exposed to a disease which necessitates testing would be sufficient to require medical attention. Notwithstanding that the term ma”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Gaspard · 801 So. 2d 663 - State v. Ahlfeldt

2. “vagueness challenges to statues [sic] which do not invoke First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case . . . [a] defendant engaged in conduct clearly described in a statute cannot complain of the vagueness of the statute as applied to others . . . [a] defendant [therefore] may not establish that a statute is unconstitutionally vague by speculating about hypothetical conduct which could also be prosecuted under the same statute.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 868 So. 2d 9 - State v. Interiano · 953 So. 2d 91 - State v. Williams

3. “[A] vagueness challenge to a statute must be examined in the light of the facts of the case . . . and as applied to the particular defendant . . . [who] must show at trial that the statute lacks specificity as to his behavior.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 868 So. 2d 9 - State v. Interiano · 953 So. 2d 91 - State v. Williams