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710 So. 2d 479

Railey v. State

Decided January 30, 1998

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 2011

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““[T]he resolution of this issue requires a two-step process. First, implicit in the language of § 13A-5-6(a)(5) — ‘a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony5 — is the requirement that the underlying felony for which the defendant is convicted have, as one of its necessary elements, the element of intentional criminal conduct. Therefore, McCree’s reckless or negligent conduct, which resulted in manslaughter, while sufficient to supply the criminal scienter to support a conviction for a Class C felony, does not require a finding that he intentionally used the firearm to commit the felony, and thus can not support the application of § 13A-5-6(a)(5). In other words, reading § 13A-5-6 as a whole, we must construe subsection (a)(5) to mean that convictions for those underlying felonies that are committed without the intentional use of a deadly weapon do not fall within the category of convictions that invoke the enhancement provision of this statute. “Second, ‘enhancement,’ as that word is used to describe the effect of § 13A-5 — 6(a)(5), necessarily means that in addition to the culpability of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted, the defendant’s conduct is necessarily the result of a higher degree of culpability, because of the jury’s finding that a ‘firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony.’ Indeed, the use of a deadly weapon to commit the underlying felony is the”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Asher Bragan Bole v. State of Alabama.

Relies on Ex Parte McCree · 710 So. 2d 477 - Railey v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1998-01-30

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

BUTTS, Justice.

¶1WRIT QUASHED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, COOK, and SEE, JJ., concur.MADDOX, J., dissents.MADDOX, Justice

¶2(dissenting).

¶3I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to quash the writ of certiorari. Jack Brian Railey was charged with murder for shooting and killing his girlfriend, Constance A. McClenny, during an argument. Although Railey was charged with murder, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless manslaughter. The jury found Railey guilty of the lesser charge, and the trial judge sentenced Railey to 168 months in prison.

¶4Railey appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erroneously applied the provisions of § 13A-5-6(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, *480Alabama’s firearm enhancement statute. Specifically, Railey contended that, because he was convicted of only reckless manslaughter, he had not been found to have the requisite intent necessary to apply the sentence-enhancement provisions of § 13A-5-6(a)(5). The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. Relying on Ex parte McCree, 554 So.2d 336 (Ala.1988), that court stated: “The record establishes that the appellant was convicted of reckless manslaughter; thus, the firearm enhancement provisions of § 13A-5-6(a)(5) are inapplicable.” Railey v. State, 710 So.2d 477, 478 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). Because the record was unclear, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case, instructing the trial court that, if it had applied the enhancement provisions, it was to resentence Railey without applying those provisions. On remand, the trial court specified that it had not applied the enhancement provisions of § 13A-5-6(a)(5) when it sentenced Railey, and the Court of Criminal Appeals, on April 18, 1997, on return to remand, upheld the conviction and the sentence.

¶5The State petitioned this Court for certio-rari review of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision, arguing that, under the facts of this case, the enhancement provisions of § 13A-5 — 6(a)(5) should have been applied. I agree. It is undisputed that Railey committed at least a Class B felony and that this crime was committed with the use of a firearm. See § 13A-6-3(b), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, I believe the enhancement provisions of § 13A-5-6(a)(5) apply. That section clearly states that “[f]or a Class B or C felony in which a firearm or deadly weapon was used or attempted to be used in the commission of the felony, [the sentence shall be] not less than 10 years.” I think this language clearly indicates the Legislature’s intent that the enhancement provisions be applied in a case such as this. As I explained in my dissent in McCree, I believe that construing § 13A-5-6(a)(5) as the Court of Criminal Appeals has construed it in this case could eliminate the statute’s minimum-sentence provisions in most cases involving Class B or C felonies, and I do not believe the Legislature intended such a result. McCree, 554 So.2d at 342 (Maddox, J., dissenting).

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