Schacht v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis
711 F.2d 1343 · 1983
Citation profile
63 federal appellate · 20 district · 22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 229 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2013 · most notably Hj Inc v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company (1989), O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance (1994)
63 federal appellate · 20 district · 22 state decisions — followed in 10 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1292
Relies on Conley v. Gibson · United States v. Turkette · Helfat v. Securities & Exchange Commission · Nelson v. County of Los Angeles · United States v. Elliott
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 229 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“imputing the great complexity of antitrust law enforcement”
14 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““ ‘Defendants argue nonetheless that since the alleged fraudulent scheme had the effect of continuing [the insurer’s] active corporate existence past the point of insolvency to the detriment of outside creditors and policyholders, [the insurer] was pro tanto benefitted. But the fact that [the insurer’s] existence may have been artificially prolonged pales in comparison with the real damage allegedly inflicted by the diminution of its assets and income. Under such circumstances, the prolonged artificial solvency of [the insurer] benefitted only [the insurer’s] managers and the other alleged conspirators, not the corporation.’ ””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Fraud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against it. Fraud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the shareholders are the principal if not only victims; their equities vis-á-vis a careless or reckless auditor are therefore strong. But the stockholders of a corporation whose officers commit fraud for the benefit of the corporation are beneficiaries of the fraud. Maybe not net beneficiaries, after the fraud is unmasked and the corporation is sued — that is a question of damages, and is not before us. But the primary costs of a fraud on the corporation’s behalf are borne not by the stockholders but by outsiders to the corporation, and the stockholders should not be allowed to escape all responsibility for such a fraud, as they are trying to do in this case.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.