dissent">CADENA, Chief Justice,

dissenting in part.

I cannot agree that the order of contempt in this case is void because the provisions for child support found in the divorce decree are not specific enough to permit enforcement by contempt proceedings.

The rule that punishment by contempt for disobedience of an order of a court is possible only when the order in question is specific and unambiguous is a salutary rule. It would be grossly unjust to punish a person for disobedience when he has not been told what he is to do or to refrain from doing. But our courts, in applying this wholesome rule, have gone to great extremes in order to conclude that the alleged contemnor was ignorant of his obligations under the court order. The holding by the majority in this case is a good example of findings of lack of specificity which are apparently based on the premise that the person charged with contempt is an idiot incapable of understanding simple language. If a person is so mentally deficient that he is unable to determine how to comply with the provisions of the divorce decree in this case, the defense to the contempt proceedings should not be lack of *217specificity in the order but, rather, mental incompetence.

The order in this case in “clear, specific and unambiguous terms” tells relator what he must do in order to comply with the order commands that relator pay $25.00 per week for child support, and that such payments be made through the child support division of the juvenile office. If relator had, every week, delivered $25.00 to the child support division of the juvenile department for the support of his child, there could be no question concerning his compliance with the order in the divorce decree. He would have fully complied with the order because he had done exactly what the order required him to do. There was no need for relator to attempt to interpret the language of the order. All that was required was that, every Monday he make the payment “through” the child support office. I am unable to understand the mystery which the majority believes exists as to the obligations imposed on relator by the order. The clear and simple language is not susceptible to different meanings. It does not order relator to make the payments to “any specific person,” but it tells him how to comply with the order of the court. I know of no requirement that support payments be made to a “specific person.” There is nothing wrong with an order which requires that the payments be made to a named agency or institution.

The conclusion is clear. The order told relator what to do and he did not do it. The argument that he was left in the dark concerning his obligation under the order is completely unpersuasive unless we assume that he lacks the mental capacity to understand simple language.

I agree that relator must be discharged, but I would base the order of discharge solely on the fact that no evidence was presented to support the finding that relator had not complied with the order. The provisions of § 14.32(a) of the Texas Family code concerning the effect of a failure to file a general denial cannot be constitutionally applied to contempt proceedings.

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