Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co.’s Empirical Analysis
713 F.2d 32 · 1983
Citation profile
40 federal appellate · 19 district · 11 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 118 later decisions — most recently July 2024 · most notably Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins (1995), Wheeler v. Hurdman (1987)
40 federal appellate · 19 district · 11 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory · Lorillard v. Pons · Bates v. State Bar · United States v. Silk · Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 118 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the 'employer' or the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the 'employer'; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the 'employer' pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties.”
15 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Court found that Congress 'intended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA.' Thus, ADEA's scope for purposes of procedure and remedies is determined by FLSA. However, the substantive 'prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.' Therefore, the scope of its substantive prohibition of discrimination in employment is determined by Title VII. The determination of employee status is a question relating to the substantive prohibitions of ADEA and not to its remedies and procedures. Consequently, the hybrid standard that combines the common law 'right to control' with the 'economic realities' as applied in Title VII cases is the correct standard for determining employee status under ADEA.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) the employer's right to control the means and manner of the worker's performance; (2) the kind of occupationsupervised or unsupervised; (3) skill; (4) who furnishes the equipment and workplace; (5) the length of time in which the individual has worked; (6) the method of payment; (7) the manner of termination of the work relationship; (8) whether there is annual leave; (9) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer;" (10) whether the worker accrues retirement benefits; (11) whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the parties.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.