713 So. 2d 588 - State v. Bailey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To prove that a defendant is a habitual offender, the state must establish by competent evidence the prior felony convictions and that defendant is the same person who was convicted of the prior felonies. State v. Chaney, 423 So.2d 1092 (La.1982); State v. Bailey, 97-302 (La.App. 5 Cir.4/28/98), 713 So.2d 588 , writ denied, 98-1458 (La.10/30/98), 723 So.2d 971 . The state may establish this by various means, such as the testimony of witnesses to prior crimes, expert testimony matching fingerprints of the accused with those in the record of prior proceedings or photographs contained in a duly authenticated record. State v. Bailey, supra; State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99 (La.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 , 108 S.Ct. 1754 , 100 L.Ed.2d 216 (1988). Additionally, this court has held that testimony comparing a defendant's current fingerprints with those found on prior arrest records is sufficient to prove that the defendant was the person convicted of a prior felony. State v. Hollins, 99-278 (La.App. 5 Cir.8/31/99), 742 So.2d 671 ; State v. Bell, 97-1134 (La. App. 5 Cir.2/25/98), 709 So.2d 921, 926 , writ denied, 98-0792 (La.9/16/98), 721 So.2d 477 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Monroe · 784 So. 2d 19 - State v. Sanders

2. “... [w]e must look to the Legislative intent regarding multiplying defendant's punishment under these circumstances. Clearly, in enacting the Racketeering Act, the Legislature expressed its clear intent to increase the punishment for the individual crimes when a pattern of criminal or racketeering activity is also proven. Moreover, in looking to our federal counterpart we note that the federal courts have consistently held that prosecuting and sentencing of a defendant for both Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO), 18:1961 et seq . violations and the predicate offenses does not violate double jeopardy. United States v. Padgett , 78 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 1996) ; United States v. O'Connor , 953 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. [1992] ), cert. denied , 504 U.S. 924 , 112 S.Ct. 1979 , 118 L.Ed.2d 578 (1992) ; United States v. Evans , 951 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 504 U.S. 920 , 112 S.Ct. 1966 , 118 L.Ed.2d 567 (1992) ; United States v. Arnoldt , 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 503 U.S. 983 , 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992) ; United States v. Erwin , 793 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. [1986] ), cert. denied , 479 U.S. 991 , 107 S.Ct. 589 , 93 L.Ed.2d 590 (1986).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 243 So. 3d 725 - State v. Gumms

3. “Many of the federal eases holding that the prosecution and sentencing of a defendant to both RICO conspiracy and the predicate offenses does not violate double jeopardy supported their decisions on the holding in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 , 105 S.Ct. 2407 , 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). In Garnett , the court considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred prosecution for a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offense after an earlier prosecution for one of the predicate offenses. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that prosecution for CCE after the prosecution for one of the predicate offenses was constitutional.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 829 So. 2d 561 - State v. Ables