Thompson v. Wainwright’s Empirical Analysis
714 F.2d 1495 · 1983
Citation profile
47 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 96 later decisions — most recently August 2019 · most notably Thompson v. Wainwright (1986), 759 So. 2d 650 - Thompson v. State (2000)
47 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1292 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Younger v. Harris · Wainwright v. Sykes · Fay v. Noia · Rose v. Lundy · Sanders v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 96 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In adopting a total exhaustion rule the Court in Rose spoke of the desirability of giving state courts the opportunity to first pass upon and correct a constitutional violation. The Court stressed the importance of “minimizing friction between our federal and state systems of justice” by allowing the state an “initial opportunity” to act. There is no suggestion that the state’s interest cannot be vindicated by passing up the opportunity when it elects to do so or that the extension of the opportunity is in fact an irrevocable mandate that the state court must act first.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“[c]omity is not a one way street.... Strong federal interests may exist that, balanced against those of the state in the particular case, will permit the district court in its discretion to decline a waiver and require state exhaustion.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“By Florida judicial decisions, the grant of specific state powers to the attorney general does not deprive [her] of the powers belonging to [her] under the common law, which include prosecuting ‘all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenue of the state ... ’ State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189 , 155 So. 823, 827 (1934). Also, “it is [her] duty, in the absence of express legislative restrictions to the contrary, to exercise all such power and authority as public interests may require from time to time.” Id. Moreover, in Florida the office of attorney general is in many respects judicial in character, and [she] is clothed with considerable .discretion. Id. 155 So. at 828 . The attorney general’s authority runs beyond responsibility to the government qua government. [She] is responsible to the people .... “The Attorney General is the principal law officer of the state.” Id. [State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333 ] 126 So. [374] at 377 [ (1930) ]. We conclude that under these powers granted by the Florida common law, statutes and case law, the state’s attorney general had the authority to expressly waive exhaustion of state remedies so that all claims could be presented and decided in one federal proceeding. Florida law gives the attorney general authority to waive exhaustion whether exhaustion, as we hold, promotes the interests of the state as sovereign or, as some other courts have held, promotes only the interests of s”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.