¶2 Washington state prisoner Mark Mar-kussen appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations related to the handling of his legal mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
¶3 The district court properly granted summary judgment on Markussen’s due process claim because Markussen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was provided with the process he was due. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417-19, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (explaining minimal procedural safeguards prisons must comply with in handling of legal mail), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 418-19, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989).
¶4 The district court properly granted summary judgment on Markussen’s access-to-courts claim because Markussen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (setting forth elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury requirement).
¶5 The district court properly granted summary judgment on Markussen’s retaliation claim because Markussen failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant took adverse action against him because of his protected conduct. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context).
¶6 We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
¶7 Markussen’s requests, set forth in Docket'Entry No. 16, are denied.
¶8 AFFIRMED.