715 So. 2d 274 - Register v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Florida Legislature has classified as a felony the act of procuring for prostitution anyone under age 18. This designation is consistent with the intent to proscribe the commercial exploitation of children induced to engage in sexual activity with others for the financial benefit of the procurer pimp. ...Procuring for prostitution anyone 18 years of age or older is a misdemeanor under section 796.07. Soliciting anyone (irrespective of age) for prostitution likewise is a misdemeanor under section 796.07. The appellant tried to induce the minor victim to have sex with him, but she refused his offer. This was mere solicitation, not procurement. We find nothing in either statute that would support the State's argument that offering money while soliciting someone to have sex with the offeror was intended to have the same criminal consequences as inducing a victim to engage in sexual activity with a third party to the financial benefit of the pimp. A person who offers money to a minor to have sex with him commits a crime. The Florida Legislature has designated such an act of solicitation as a less severe crime than exploiting a minor to engage in sexual activity with a third party, to the procurer's financial advantage. This distinction is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch. If it had intended to classify the act of solicitation of a minor as a felony, the Florida Legislature easily could have done so.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 745 So. 2d 979 - Kobel v. State

2. “To the extent that penal statutory language is indefinite or `is susceptible of differing constructions,' due process requires a strict construction of the language in the defendant's favor under the rule of lenity. Construing sections 796.03 and 796.07 together, we conclude that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal. Section 796.03 addresses only procurement for prostitution, not solicitation. Section 796.07(2)(f) makes it unlawful `[t]o solicit ... or procure another to commit prostitution ...' Although neither statute defines either `solicit' or `procure' the context in which the two terms are used in section 796.07 indicates a legislative intent to distinguish between the two acts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 745 So. 2d 979 - Kobel v. State

3. “While it is true that `procure' may mean to act as a `pimp' and not necessarily procure the person for oneself, it is also clear that `procure' may mean persuading, inducing, or prevailing upon the person to do something sexual for oneself. A reading of the statute reflects both definitions as being criminal conduct. This is especially true in light of the fact that the intent behind the statute is the state's compelling interest in protecting underage people from being sexually abused or exploited.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 745 So. 2d 979 - Kobel v. State