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← 716 F.2d 130 - McCarthy v. The Bark Peking

McCarthy v. The Bark Peking’s Empirical Analysis

716 F.2d 130 · 1983

Citation profile

36
cited by 36 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
August 2011
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 36 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2011 · most notably Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co. (2005), Drake v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1985)

18 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

1901983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 1 U.S.C. § 3 · 29 U.S.C. § 660 (§ 11 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) · 33 U.S.C. § 902 · 33 U.S.C. § 905

Relies on Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois · Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki · S.S. Zoe Colocotroni v. Puerto Rico · Reed v. Steamship Yaka · Trammel v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “capable of being used as a means of transportation on water”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “The Peking may be fated to ride at anchor for the rest of her days. Her rudder is welded in place. Her owner has no intention of slipping her moorings and taking her again to the open seas, with the seagulls in her wake. But she retains at least this much of the dignity of her former venerable station: as long as she rides at anchor in the harbor, ready and able to head for the open seas, even in tow, she remains a vessel. Much as we should like to formulate a definition of “vessel” that captures the essence of the seagoing definiendum, no Platonic form suggests itself; hence we are left with the halting efforts of the common law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Since Congress, in its use of the term `vessel' in §§ 902(21) and 905(b), did not provide a definition different from the generally acknowledged one found in section 3, we may presume, as other courts have, that it intended to adopt this commonly-used term.... [C]ases decided under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 541-713 (1976), have looked to a different test in determining what is a vessel for Jones Act purposes.... A craft need not be actually engaged in navigation or commerce in order to come within the definition of `vessel.' The question is one of residual capacity.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.