Colón v. Tracey’s Empirical Analysis
717 F.3d 43 · 2013
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 7 district ·
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White · Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. · Mesnick v. General Electric Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] plaintiff must first establish ... that (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the first and second elements. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged actions.... [I]f the defendant does so, the ultimate burden falls on the plaintiff to show that the proffered legitimate reason is in fact a pretext and that the job action was the result of the defendant’s retaliatory animus.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“by showing that (1) she engaged in protected conduct, (2) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the first and second elements.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Title VTI’s antiretaliation provision does not “immunize ... employee[s] from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience,” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 , 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); rather, it seeks “to prevent employer interference with ‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms,” id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 , 117 S.Ct. 843 , 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). Thus, to qualify as materially adverse, an employer’s challenged action “must be one that ‘could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Dixon v. Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 ).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.