Brown v. Ep Perini’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 federal appellate · 2 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Ultimately, the case rests upon whether, the petitioner was aware of all the direct consequences of his guilty plea. He certainly understood that the mandatory sentence for aggravated murder was life imprisonment. However, he claims that his plea is vitiated by the misinformation regarding parole. We must reject this claim. This Circuit has expressly declined to consider parole eligibility a direct consequence of a guilty plea. Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.1977). In Armstrong , this Court considered a state prisoner’s claim that his constitutional right to due process had been violated when the trial judge failed to inform him that one of the consequences of his plea to an offense requiring a sentence of life imprisonment was parole ineligibility.... Several other circuits have held that due process does not require that a defendant be advised regarding parole consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 636 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam); Hunter v. Fogg, 616 F.2d 55, 61 (2d Cir.1980); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir.1979). These circuits appear to agree that parole is not a direct consequence within the meaning of Brady[ v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) ]. We are, therefore, constrained by this Court’s pronouncement in Armstrong . In light of the peculiar facts in this case, misinformation concerning the collateral consequences of the petitioner’s guilty pleas does not constitute a violation of”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Xie v. Edwards · 33 F. Supp. 3d 897 - Plumaj v. Booker

2. “[T]he decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and the likelihood of securing leniency through a plea bargain.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Caudill v. Jago

3. “is not invalid merely because [it is] entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Caudill v. Jago