Boutte v. Seitchik’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Since the agreement between the physician and his patient is contractual in nature, for there to be a valid consent it must be clear that both parties understand the nature of the undertaking and what the possible as well as expected results might be. It will be no defense for a surgeon to prove that the patient had given his consent, if the consent was not given with a true understanding of the nature of the operation to be performed, the seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results. A physician or surgeon need not disclose all known information; however, the physician or surgeon is required to advise the patient of those material facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery that a reasonable person would consider significant in deciding whether to have the operation. Gouse v. Cassel, 532 Pa. 197, 202-203 , 615 A.2d 331, 333-334 (1992) (citations, quotation marks and emphasis omitted). However, a plaintiff need not prove that a causal relationship exists between the physician’s or surgeon’s failure to disclose information and the patient’s consent to undergo surgery. Gouse, 532 Pa. at 202 , 615 A.2d at 333 . This Court has also recognized that a plaintiff need not prove by expert testimony that the surgery caused an injury. Rowinsky v. Sperling, 452 Pa.Super. 215 , 681 A.2d 785, 790 (Pa.Super.1996), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 738 , 690 A.2d 237 (1997). Recovery on the theory of informed cons”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center

2. ““In reviewing a motion for judgment n.o.v., ‘the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, and he must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in his favor.’ . . . Moreover, [a] judgment n.o.v. should only be entered in a clear case and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the verdict winner. . . . Further, ‘a judge’s appraisement of evidence is not to be based on how he would have voted had he been a member of the jury, but on the facts as they come through the sieve of the jury’s deliberations....’ “There are two bases upon which a judgment n.o.v. can be entered: one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,... and/or two, the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the mov-ant. . . . With the first a court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor, whereas with the second the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.” 529 Pa. 394, 402-403 , 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (citations omitted); see also, Boutte v. Seitchik, 719 A.2d 319 (Pa. Super. 1998).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ricca v. Jackson

3. “In examining [jury] instructions, our scope of review is to determine whether the trial court committed [a] clear abuse of discretion or [an] error of law controlling the outcome of the case. Error in a charge is sufficient ground for a new trial, if the charge as a whole is inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than clarify a material issue. A charge will be found adequate unless the issues are not made clear to the jury or the jury was palpably misled by what the trial judge said or unless there is an omission which amounts to fundamental error. A reviewing court will not grant a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of the charge unless there is a prejudicial omission of something basic or fundamental. In reviewing a trial court’s charge to the jury, we must not take the challenged words or passage out of context of the whole of the charge, but must look to the charge in its entirety.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2004 Pa. Super. 393 - Potochnick v. Perry