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719 So. 2d 315

Feltzin v. Bernard

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1998-08-05

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Prior to trial Bernard served a demand for judgment upon defendant Feltzin for the sum of $10,000, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995). No demand for judgment was made against Oak Casualty, Feltzin's liability insurance carrier. In fact, counsel for Bernard acknowledged during the motion for attorney's fees that Oak Casualty was not a party to the motion for attorney's fees against Feltzin. Accordingly, we conclude that the order granting attorney's fees against Oak Casualty must be reversed. Our ruling is without prejudice to the assertion of any bad faith claims which may exist.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 755 So. 2d 718 - Sparks v. Barnes

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1998-08-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 2015

3 state decisions

10199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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PER CURIAM.

¶1Karen Feltzin and Oak Casualty Insurance Company, (Oak Casualty), appeal a final judgment of damages and attorney’s fees. They argue that the trial court impermissibly restricted their cross-examination of one of plaintiffs expert witnesses and improperly allowed the reading of irrelevant and prejudicial portions of an Oak Casualty adjuster’s deposition into evidence. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err on the cross-examination issue and that, even if the reading of the deposition was error, it was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment entered below.

¶2Oak Casualty additionally argues that the trial judge erred by entering an order granting attorney’s fees against it. Before addressing this issue we note that Oak Casualty played a dual role in this case as both Feltzin’s liability insurer and Bernard’s uninsured motorist carrier.

¶3Prior to trial Bernard served a demand for judgment upon defendant Feltzin for the sum of $10,000, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995). No demand for judgment was made against Oak Casualty, Felt-zin’s liability insurance carrier. In fact, counsel for Bernard acknowledged during the motion for attorney’s fees that Oak Casualty was not a party to the motion for attorney’s fees against Feltzin. Accordingly, we conclude that the order granting attorney’s fees against Oak Casualty must be reversed. Our ruling is without prejudice to the assertion of any bad faith claims which may exist.

¶4Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

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