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← 72 SO2D 375 - Clark v. Sumner

Clark v. Sumner’s Empirical Analysis

1954

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
7
states following
July 2000
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 27 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently July 2000 · most notably Gauck v. Meleski (1965), 340 So. 2d 922 - Ingram v. Pettit (1976)

3 federal appellate · 27 state decisions

190195419601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Gosma v. Adams · Smith v. State Ex Rel. Ally · Allen v. Hooper · Broadnax v. State · Lemkie v. Boice

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"To uphold the contention of the defendant would be tantamount to releasing the driver of a car from any legal responsibility for the safety of those following him on the highways. Such is not the law. We reiterate and again approve the principle laid down in Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458 , 171 So. 513 , that the violation of a traffic law or regulation is prima facie evidence of negligence that may be overcome by other facts and circumstances in the cause in fixing ultimate liability."”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “* * * “(c) When approaching within one hundred feet of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““* * * Is this language intended to prohibit all vehicles from driving in the left-hand lane when approaching the crest of a grade, or does it mean, as plaintiff contends, that the prohibition applies only if the vehicle crosses over from right to left as it approaches the crest of the grade? We think it means the former, not the latter. A car which has been on the left side of the road for some time and remains there as it approaches the crest of the hill is just as much a hazard to traffic approaching from the opposite direction as a vehicle which crosses over into the left-hand lane when approaching the crest of the hill. We find nothing in the language of the statute, or in the evident purpose of the statute, which would cause us to construe it to be applicable only to those vehicles crossing over from right to left as they approach the crest of the grade. The intention of the legislature, we think, was to prevent all cars from being in the left lane when approaching the crest of a grade, not just those which cross over when approaching the crest. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the preposition ‘to’ as used in paragraph 4 is synonymous with ‘on’ or ‘upon.’ Obviously, if the preposition ‘to’ is synonymous with ‘on’ or ‘upon’ with respect to this situation (approaching the crest of a grade), it has the same meaning when applied to the other specific situations set out in paragraph 4, including travel in the left lane within one hundred- feet of an intersection.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.