72 So. 3d 892 - Hebert v. Richard’s Empirical Analysis
2011
Citation profile
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 591 So. 2d 342 - Schroeder v. Board of Sup'rs · 397 So. 2d 475 - Bazley v. Tortorich · Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co. · 731 So. 2d 208 - Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems · 653 So. 2d 1152 - Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“GMI is not a borrowing employer. Further, the control by Industrial in this case renders Industrial, but not GMI, liable for workers' compensation benefits and entitled to tort immunity if Mr. Hebert was in the course and scope of his employment with Industrial at the time of his accident. Industrial states that he was not.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“, and is under the control and direction of the special employer in the performance of the work, both the special employer and the immediate employer, referred to in this Section as a”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“If an employee is found to be in the course and scope of his employment when he is injured and the employer invokes the defense of tort immunity, the employee’s remaining recourse against his employer is a claim for intentional tort. La.R.S. 23:1033. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Batiste v. Bayou Steel Corp., 10-1561, pp. 2-3 (La.10/1/10), 45 So.3d 167, 168-69 , discussed the factors involved in proving an intentional act so as to escape the coverage of the workers’ compensation act. h,In order to recover in tort against Bayou Steel under La. R.S. 23:1032(B), plaintiffs must prove Mr. Batiste’s injury resulted from an “intentional act.” In Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981), we explained an intentional act requires the actor to either (1) consciously desire the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) know that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.