Ex Parte Franklin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “is a procedural claim in which applicant's claim of innocence does not provide a basis for relief, but is tied to a showing of constitutional error at trial.” Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993)) (other citations omitted). The recantation of a witness raises a Herrera claim. See id. at 678 n. 7. 4 . The Beaumont Court expressly left open”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex Parte Navarijo · Ex Parte Gonzalez

2. “At the outset, counsel for Applicant will acknowledge that he admittedly seeks to confine the parameters of this Court’s inquiry to the unique circumstances of the instant case. The reason for Counsel’s desire to do so is simple — for if the Court’s inquiry is put generally (i.e., Can a habeas applicant who has pled guilty and waived a jury still avail himself of the relief afforded under Elizon-do?), the answer to the inquiry must always be “No.” The reason for this answer is most readily apparent from the above cited portions of Franklin and Elizondo. Simply put, the habeas court’s “weighing” of the newly discovered exculpatory evidence against the evidence of guilt adduced at trial is at the very heart of the Elizondo analysis. Absent a record with which to conduct this weighing of exculpatory evidence against the evidence of guilt, a habeas applicant simply cannot provide the very substance which is at the heart of the Elizondo inquiry. Thus, as Applicant previously asserted, it is certain that had there existed only Applicant’s plea colloquy in the instant case, Applicant would not now be before this Court. ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ Applicant recognizes the concerns that the Court might have regarding the ramifications of granting Applicant’s writ on both this court’s past and future habeas jurisprudence. If this writ is granted, will Texas' court’s (sic) face the specter of endless writs on grounds of actual innocence from those defendants who chose to enter guilty pleas? The answer ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex Parte Tuley

3. “In Ex parte Franklin, this Court held that, before a habeas applicant is entitled to a heating, the applicant must make a claim that, if true, establishes affirmative evidence of his innocence. Then, at the hearing, the trial judge assesses the witnesses’ credibility, examines the “newly discovered evidence,” and determines whether that “new” evidence, when balanced against the “old” inculpatory evidence, unquestionably establishes the applicant’s innocence. The habeas judge then sets out findings of fact and conclusions of law, and he makes a recommendation to this Court. Upon submission to this Court, we review the factual findings with deference because the habeas judge is in the best position to make credibility judgments. Even though deference is the prescribed standard, we are not bound by the habe-as judge’s findings, conclusions, or recommendations when they are not supported by the record.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex Parte Gonzalez