72 Wash. 2d 183 - Bohnsack v. Kirkham’s Empirical Analysis
1967
Citation profile
29 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently June 2012 · most notably Weden v. San Juan County (1998), 15 Ariz. App. 157 - State v. Melcher (1971)
29 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on McQuillan v. City of Seattle · Burlie v. Stephens · 65 Wash. 2d 421 - Baxter v. Greyhound Corp. · Mouso v. Bellingham & Northern Railway Co. · 64 Wash. 2d 570 - Ward v. Zeugner
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ ‘This court, on several occasions, has. held that the speed of an automobile, in excess of that permitted by statute or ordinance, was not the proximate cause of a collision when the automobile of the one charged with excessive speed was where it was entitled to be, and the driver would not have had sufficient time to-avoid the collision had he been driving at a lawful speed. [Citations omitted.]’ ” 432 P.2d at 561-562 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The proposed instruction, which is an exact quote from the Bailey case, imposes a limitation upon the jury as to what they can consider in determining whether or not the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was the proximate cause, or a proximate cause, of the plaintiff’s injury. The instructions as given by this court properly set out that the plaintiff could possibly be contributorily negligent due to excessive speed and then instructs the jury that they should find for the defendant if they find that plaintiff’s contributory negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s own injury. However, nowhere in the instructions did the court indicate to the jury that there was a limitation upon them, as a matter of law, in respect to the excessive speed, if 'any, of the plaintiff as a proximate cause of the injury. As instructed, the jury in this case could well have found from the evidence that there may have been some excessive speed on the part of the plaintiff, particularly in view of the “appropriate reduced speed at the intersection” instruction, this being a failure to use ordinary care as defined by the courts and, without the limiting language, that this was a proximate cause of the accident and the plaintiff could not therefore recover.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[P]hysical facts are uncontroverted and speak with a force that overcomes all testimony to the contrary, reasonable minds must follow the physical facts, and therefore cannot differ.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.