McCrae v. Wt Hankins’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

60 federal appellate · 2 district · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 111 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ucc v. Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company · Keado v. United States

2. “The Supreme Court recently concluded ... that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself create in an inmate a protected interest in being confined in the general prison population. Instead, the Clause standing alone requires only that an inmate be confined under conditions consistent with his sentence, and ‘administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.’ A state may, however, create by statute or regulation an interest protected by the Due Process Clause even though the same interest is not among those protected by the Clause standing alone. Regulations of Louisiana’s Department of Corrections, in effect at the time McCrae was disciplined, were sufficient to extend to Louisiana inmates a protected liberty interest in not being confined to extended lockdown.... Louisiana has required that its inmates be provided with certain process before they may be confined in extended lock-down. First, the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (LAPA), applies to prison disciplinary proceedings, and requires that the disciplinary board hold a hearing on reasonable notice at which all parties may present evidence and conduct cross-examination. The Louisiana Department of Corrections has by regulation expanded on LAPA’s general requirements by providing that ‘[n]o prisoner can be placed in extended lockdown for any reason unless he has been afforded a full hearing before ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wallace v. Teer

3. “Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. If officials may transfer a prisoner 'for whatever reason or for no reason at all,' ... there is no such interest for process to protect.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Tyrone Green, Cross-Appellants v. William T. (Billy) Ferrell, Etc., Cross- Moses Belton, Etc., Cross-Appellant v. William T. Ferrell, Etc., Cross-Appellees