Trottie v. Stephens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland 's deferential standard.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mejia v. Stephens

2. “decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” (emphasis added)); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 , 473, 127 S.Ct, 1933 , 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (stating that AEDPA review does not involve”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Charles v. Stephens

3. “'even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable,'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mejia v. Stephens