Furman v. Shapiro’s Empirical Analysis
1998
Citation profile
9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently May 2012
9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on In re Bohn · DiFranco v. Pickard · 445 Pa. Super. 479 - Dodson v. Elvey · Roman Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Insurance companies may offer motorists a “limited tort option” under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705. See generally Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7. If the motorist selects this option, he or she surrenders the right to sue for non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering, which were sustained in a motor vehicle accident unless the claimant suffers a serious injury. Id. Until recently, Dodson controlled the procedural approach for determining whether a limited tort plaintiff suffered serious bodily injury for purposes of claiming non-economic damages. In Dodson , we held that the trial court was to make a threshold determination concerning the seriousness of a limited tort elector’s injuries. The Dodson approach was rejected in Washington where our Supreme Court held that the traditional standard for determining whether summary judgment applied was to be used in the limited tort option cases. The Washington Court ruled that the determination of whether serious injury exists should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases. In other words, unless reasonable minds can not differ as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury, summary judgment is not appropriate. “Serious injury” under the MVFRL is defined as a “personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. The Washington Court acknowledged that neither the law nor the leg”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.