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721 A.2d 167

In re Rushfield

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Decided December 10, 1998

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · decided 1998-12-10

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently March 2000

1 state decisions

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (§ 501 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974)

Relies on In Re Ramacciotti

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1998-12-10

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PER CURIAM:

¶1Respondent Mark C. Rushfield entered a guilty plea to three misdemeanor counts charging willful violations of 29 U.S.C. § 1131 relating to ERISA reporting requirements. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reprimanded respondent, and subsequently the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, issued a public censure as reciprocal discipline.

¶2Advised of these actions, we entered an order referring the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility for a recommendation whether identical, greater, or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline, or whether the Board elected to proceed de novo, pursuant to D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11. In its Report and Recommendation to us, the Board on Professional Responsibility concludes that respondent’s misconduct warrants a substantially different sanction in the District of Columbia. The Board recommends that Rushfield be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for 30 days.

¶3The Office of Bar Counsel has advised the court that it supports the Board’s Report and Recommendation, and Rushfield has not filed an exception to the Board’s recommendation. Where there is no timely opposition to the discipline recommended by the Board, “our standard of review of the Board’s recommended sanction is ... especially deferential.” In re Ramacciotti, 683 A.2d 139, 140 (D.C.1996) (citations omitted); see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(1). Accordingly, it is

¶4ORDERED that Mark C. Rushfield, Esquire, is suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of thirty days. Respondent’s attention is called to the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, including the affidavit requirement of subsection (g), and to the consequences of not timely complying with the requirements of section 14 set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(c).

¶5So ordered.

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