¶1(concurring).
¶2I concur in the opinion of the majority. I write separately to address the majority’s conclusion that, when we conduct a plain error review of unobjected-to prose-cutorial misconduct, the state, rather than the defendant, should bear the burden of persuasion on the third prong of the plain error doctrine.
¶3Without a doubt, the majority’s holding represents a sharp and radical departure — a 180° turn — from our court’s and the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as to the burden of persuasion on the third prong of the plain error test. See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn.1998) (stating that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of persuasion on this third prong”); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (stating that, under the federal plain error rule — Rule 52(b) — “[i]t is the defendant^] rather than the Government^] who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to [the third prong].”). While I acknowledge that the rationale for the majority’s decision to shift the burden of proof to the state on this prong has some merit, I am concerned with our court making such a sharp departure from precedent when the concept of shifting the burden of persuasion was not fully developed in the parties’ briefs or orally argued before our court, and does not have well-developed case law to support it. The majority acknowledges the former point when it states that Ramey argues for a pre-Griller harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt analysis and the state advocates that we adhere to our Grillerplain-error analysis.
¶4In essence, this case is about how we as an appellate court go about doing our business. I would much prefer an approach whereby, in the context of this issue in this case, we adhere to our well-established *304precedent, but in the majority or by concurrence or dissent signal that we invite arguments in the future that specifically address this issue. Under such circumstances, we would have the benefit of well-developed arguments, could properly evaluate the merits of each side’s argument, and could then decide this issue. It is for this reason that I believe it is imprudent for us to adopt the burden-shifting change adopted by the majority. Based upon the facts and arguments presented here, I conclude that, for now, it is best that we adhere to our well-established precedent and the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court.