Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
58 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 58 later decisions — most recently June 2016 · most notably Hughes v. State (1994), Blake v. State (1998)
58 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Doyle v. Ohio · Almanza v. State · Fletcher v. Weir · Polk v. State · Moore v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Our law provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Cocaine is a controlled substance. * * * * * * Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or before the 19th day of December, 1990, in Walker County, Texas, the Defendant, EDDIE ROY MOSS, knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance, ... with intent to deliver said controlled substance, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. * * * * * * The defendant is presumed to be innocent unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and in case you have a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant’s guilt after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions, you will acquit him.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Moss v. State“Where the jury is the trier of fact, the trial court may not properly enter that they have made an affirmative finding concerning the defendant’s use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or firearm during the commission of the offense unless: 1) the deadly weapon has been specifically plead as such (using the nomenclature ‘deadly weapon’) in the indictment. (Applies where the verdict reads, ‘guilty as charged in the indictment.’ See Barecky [v. State, 639 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) ], supra.) 2) where not specifically pled in ‘1)’ above as a deadly weapon or firearm, the weapon pled is per se a deadly weapon or a firearm; or 3) a special issue is submitted and answered affirmatively, (emphasis in original)”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Willmann v. State“Now, bearing in mind the foregoing instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 4th day of April, 1976, in Austin County, Texas, the defendant, Billy George Hughes, Jr., did intentionally and knowingly cause the death of Mark A. Frederick, a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, by shooting him with a gun, and the said Billy George Hughes, Jr., then and there knew that the said Mark A. Frederick was a peace officer, then you will find the defendant, Billy George Hughes, Jr., guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment and so say by your verdict....”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Hughes v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.