State v. Majeres’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “At the time Majeres entered her guilty plea, our rule allowed a defendant, when pleading guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor, to waive the defendant’s appearance in open court to engage in an in-court colloquy. Iowa R.Crim. P. 8(2)(b) (2001) (amended Nov. 9, 2001, eff. Feb. 15, 2002; amended Dec. 22, 2008, eff. Nov. 1, 2004). In the Sioux County case, Majeres signed a written plea of guilty without counsel. In that written plea, she acknowledged the charge against her as OWI, second offense; her right to counsel; and the maximum and minimum sentences. Thus, her written plea met the informational requirements under Tovar to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty. An in-court colloquy is not necessary to ensure the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See [Iowa v.J Tovar, 541 U.S. [77,] 87-88, 124 S.Ct. [1879,] 1387,158 L.Ed.2d [209,] 220 [ (2004) ] (stating the Court has not “prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant” in regards to the intelligence of waiving the right to counsel). A written guilty plea containing such a waiver is prima facie evidence the defendant gave the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Iowa 2003) (holding a written waiver of the right to a jury trial is prima facie evidence the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent). [[Image here]] Consequently, the district court may use Majeres’ uncounseled guilty plea to the OWI, second offense, in Sioux Count”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State of Iowa v. Walter Scott Sutton