State v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`This court has long held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless they fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Chevere v. State , 607 So.2d 361 , 368 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). These exceptions are: (1) plain view; (2) consent; (3) incident to a lawful arrest; (4) hot pursuit or emergency; (5) probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances; (6) stop and frisk situations; and (7) inventory searches. Ex parte Hilley , 484 So.2d 485 , 488 (Ala. 1985); Chevere , supra, 607 So.2d at 368 .'”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Urioso v. State · Dardy v. State

2. “"Although the trial court did not make specific findings of fact in support of its decision to grant the motion to suppress, we can infer from the record that the motion was granted because of the discrepancy between the testimony of Officer Tilley and the information contained in his report and the affidavit prepared by Investigator Greene regarding where the cocaine was located at the time of the search. We believe that the trial court's conclusion was erroneous. "First, it appears that the trial court placed undue emphasis on Investigator Greene's affidavit and Officer Tilley's report. Tilley testified that he did not prepare the affidavit. Furthermore, he testified that the report he prepared, which was used by Greene to prepare the affidavit, was not a complete rendition of the facts. Thus, an argument can be made that the facts are not even in dispute; rather, the affidavit and the incident report are simply incomplete. "Second, even if we were to assume that Officer Tilley found the crack cocaine only in the appellant's pocket and that the appellant did not, as Tilley testified, discard some of the crack cocaine, suppression of the cocaine was still not warranted. As discussed above, Officer Tilley was authorized to arrest the appellant for public intoxication; therefore, the subsequent search of the appellant's pocket was incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, it appears that under either fact scenario—whether some of the cocaine was discarded and some was found in the ap”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. J.L.D. · 39 So. 3d 214 - State v. JLD

3. “`[a] search conducted immediately prior to an arrest may be justified as incident to arrest if the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect before conducting the search.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 781 So. 2d 346 - Hopper v. City of Prattville