Alexandre v. Meyer’s Empirical Analysis
1998
Citation profile
1
cited by 1 later decisions
1
states following
February 2006
most recently cited
1 state decisions
Relationships
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] trial court can properly exclude the testimony of a witness whose name has not been disclosed in accordance with a pretrial order. The discretion to do so must not be exercised blindly, however, and should be guided largely by a determination as to whether use of the undisclosed witness will prejudice the objecting party. Prejudice in this sense refers to the surprise in fact of the objecting party, and it is not dependent on the adverse nature of the testimony. Other factors which may enter into the trial court’s exercise of discretion are: (i) the objecting party’s ability to cure the prejudice, or similarly, his independent knowledge of the existence of the witness; (ii) the calling party’s possible intentional, or bad faith noncompliance with the pretrial order; and (iii) the possible disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the ease (or other cases).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.