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← 723 SW2D 802 - Higbie v. State

Higbie v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
2
states following
December 1993
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Wong Sun v. United States · Katz v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Delaware v. Prouse

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Having held that the roadblock was not a routine license check as authorized under article 6687b § 13, but instead was unquestionably a driving while intoxicated check, we must now examine it in light of the general law concerning war-rantless searches and seizures. In Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676 , we first addressed the constitutionality of a DWI roadblock. In that case, we determined a number of criteria to examine as to whether a DWI check is constitutional. “As with all warrantless searches and seizures, the constitutionality of DWI roadblocks is determined by balancing the legitimate governmental interest against the degree of intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d at 678 , citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 665 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1397 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ; United States v. Brignoni-Pounce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 , 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2588 , 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975). This balancing test for the constitutionality of a driving while intoxicated roadblock involves three considerations: first, whether the public interest in a driving while intoxicated roadblock outweighs the individual’s right to privacy; second, the degree to which the roadblock, as opposed to a less intrusive method, advances the public interest; and third, whether the valid public interest is sufficient to justify the particular intrusion committed. Webb, 695 S.W.2d at 678, 681-83 , ci”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “[T]he arresting officer testified that the sole purpose of the roadblock was to check for valid driver’s licenses. However, the intent or purpose of the stop must be measured by all the circumstances surrounding the stop. If all traffic traveling in both directions is stopped in broad daylight on a street heavily traversed by a wide variety of citizens, we would have little problem determining the intent of the stop. On the other hand, if the roadblock occurs in the middle of the night and stops all traffic traveling away from the bars on a street where bars are closing the intent is not as clear.... The check began at 1:45 a.m., about the time when the bars were closing. It was just down the street from a number of bars. The check only stopped traffic traveling away from the bars and toward a residential area; it did not stop traffic coming from the residential area toward the bars. All the officers on the check were members of the Driving While Intoxicated Squad. Given all these circumstances, it becomes apparent that the roadblock was there for the specific purpose of catching drunk drivers. The arresting officer’s testimony that the stop was solely for the purpose of checking driver’s licenses is not sufficiently persuasive to contradict the apparent intent of the stop as demonstrated by the circumstances. Therefore, we hold that the seizure of appellant was not pursuant to a routine driver’s license check as authorized under article 6687b, § 13.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.